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Abstract
We introduce the concept of control centrality to quantify the ability of a single node to control a directed weighted
network. We calculate the distribution of control centrality for several real networks and find that it is mainly determined by
the network’s degree distribution. We show that in a directed network without loops the control centrality of a node is
uniquely determined by its layer index or topological position in the underlying hierarchical structure of the network.
Inspired by the deep relation between control centrality and hierarchical structure in a general directed network, we design
an efficient attack strategy against the controllability of malicious networks.
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Introduction
Complex networks have been at the forefront of statistical
mechanics for more than a decade [1–4]. Studies of them impact
our understanding and control of a wide range of systems, from
Internet and the power-grid to cellular and ecological networks.
Despite the diversity of complex networks, several basic universal
principles have been uncovered that govern their topology and
evolution [3,4]. While these principles have significantly enriched
our understanding of many networks that affect our lives, our
ultimate goal is to develop the capability to control them [5–17].
According to control theory, a dynamical system is controllable
if, with a suitable choice of inputs, it can be driven from any initial
state to any desired final state in finite time [18–20]. By combining
tools from control theory and network science, we proposed an
efficient methodology to identify the minimum sets of driver
nodes, whose time-dependent control can guide the whole network
to any desired final state [12]. Yet, this minimum driver set (MDS)
is usually not unique, but one can often achieve multiple potential
control configurations with the same number of driver nodes.
Given that some nodes may appear in some MDSs but not in
other, a crucial question remains unanswered: what is the role of
each individual node in controlling a complex system? Therefore
the question that we address in this paper pertains to the
importance of a given node in maintaining a system’s controlla-
bility.
Historically, various types of centrality measures of a node in a
network have been introduced to determine the relative importance
of the node within the network in appropriate circumstances. For
example, the degree centrality, closeness centrality [21], between-
ness centrality [22], eigenvector centrality [23,24], PageRank [25],
hub centrality and authority centrality [26], routing centrality [27],
and so on. Here, we introduce control centrality to quantify the
ability of a single node in controlling the whole network.
Mathematically, control centrality of node i captures the dimension
of the controllable subspace or the size of the controllable subsystem
when we control node i only. This agrees well with our intuitive
notion about the ‘‘power’’ of a node in controlling the whole
network. We notice that control centrality is fundamentally different
from the concept of control range, which quantifies the ‘‘duty’’ or
‘‘responsibility’’ of a node i in controlling a network together with other
driver nodes [28].
Results
Control Centrality
Consider a complex system described by a directed weighted
network of N nodes whose time evolution follows the linear time-
invariant dynamics.
_x(t)~Ax(t)zBu(t) ð1Þ
where x(t)~(x1(t), x2(t),    , xN (t))T [ RN captures the state of
each node at time t. A[RN|N is an N|N matrix describing the
weighted wiring diagram of the network. The matrix element aij [ R
gives the strength or weight that node j can affect node i. Positive (or
negative) value of aij means the link (j?i) is excitatory (or inhibitory).
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B [ RN|M is an N|M input matrix (MƒN ) identifying the nodes
that are controlled by the time dependent input vector u(t)~
(u1(t), u2(t),    , uM (t))T [ RM with M independent signals
imposed by an outside controller. The matrix element bij[R represents
the coupling strength between the input signal uj(t) and node i. The
system (1), also denoted as (A,B), is controllable if and only if its
controllability matrixC~(B, AB,    , AN{1B) [ RN|NM has full
rank, a criteria often called Kalman’s controllability rank condition
[18]. The rank of the controllability matrix C, denoted by rank(C),
provides the dimension of the controllable subspace of the system
(A,B) [18,19]. When we control node i only, B reduces to the vector
b(i) with a single non-zero entry, and we denote C with C(i). We can
therefore use rank(C(i)) as a natural measure of node i’s ability to
control the system: if rank(C(i))~N, then node i alone can control the
whole system, i.e. it can drive the system between any points in the N-
dimensional state space in finite time. Any value of rank(C(i)) less than
N provides the dimension of the subspace i can control. In particular if
rank(C(i))~1, then node i can only control itself.
The precise value of rank(C) is difficult to determine because in
reality the system parameters, i.e. the elements of A and B, are
often not known precisely except the zeros that mark the absence
of connections between components of the system [29]. Hence A
and B are often considered to be structured matrices, i.e. their
elements are either fixed zeros or independent free parameters
[29]. Apparently, rank(C) varies as a function of the free
parameters of A and B. However, it achieves the maximal value
for all but an exceptional set of values of the free parameters which
forms a proper variety with Lebesgue measure zero in the
parameter space [30,31]. This maximal value is called the generic
rank of the controllability matrix C, denoted as rankg(C), which
also represents the generic dimension of the controllable subspace.
When rankg(C)~N, the system (A,B) is structurally controllable, i.e.
controllable for almost all sets of values of the free parameters of A
and B except an exceptional set of values with zero measure
[29,30,32,33]. For a single node i, rankg(C
(i)) captures the
‘‘power’’ of i in controlling the whole network, allowing us to
define the control centrality of node i as
Cc(i):rankg(C
(i)): ð2Þ
The calculation of rankg(C) can be mapped into a combina-
torial optimization problem on a directed graph G(A,B)
constructed as follows [31]. Connect the M input nodes
fu1,    , uMg to the N state nodes fx1,    , xNg in the original
network according to the input matrix B, i.e. connect uj to xi if
bij=0, obtaining a directed graph G(A,B) with NzM nodes (see
Fig. 1a and b). A state node j is called accessible if there is at least
one directed path reaching from one of the input nodes to node j.
In Fig. 1b, all state nodes fx1,    , x7g are accessible from the
input node u1. A stem is a directed path starting from an input
node, so that no nodes appear more than once in it, e.g.
u1?x1?x5?x7 in Fig. 1b. Denote with Gs the stem-cycle disjoint
subgraph of G(A,B), such that Gs consists of stems and cycles only,
and the stems and cycles have no node in common (highlighted in
Fig. 1b). According to Hosoe’s theorem [31], the generic
dimension of the controllable subspace is given by
rankg(C)~max
Gs[G
DE(Gs)D ð3Þ
with G the set of all stem-cycle disjoint subgraphs of the accessible
part of G(A,B) and DE(Gs)D the number of edges in the subgraph
Gs. For example, the subgraph highlighted in Fig. 1b, denoted as
Gmaxs , contains the largest number of edges among all possible
stem-cycle disjoint subgraphs. Thus, Cc(1)~rankg(C
(1))~6,
which is the number of red links in Fig. 1b. Note that
rankg(C
(1))~6vN~7, the whole system is therefore not
structurally controllable by controlling x1 only. Yet, the nodes
covered by the Gmaxs highlighted in Fig. 1b, e.g.
fx1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x7g, constitute a structurally controllable
subsystem [33]. In other words, by controlling node x1 with a
time dependent signal u1(t) we can drive the subsystem
fx1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x7g from any initial state to any final state
in finite time, for almost all sets of values of the free parameters of
A and B except an exceptional set of values with zero measure. In
general Gmaxs is not unique. For example, in Fig. 1b we can get the
same cycle x2?x3?x4?x2 together with a different stem
u1?x1?x5?x6, which yield a different Gmaxs and thus a different
structurally controllable subsystem fx1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6g. Both
subsystems are of size six, which is exactly the generic dimension of
the controllable subspace. Note that we can fully control each
subsystem individually, yet we cannot fully control the whole
system.
The advantage of Eq.(3) is that maxGs[G DE(G)D can be
calculated via linear programming [34], providing us an efficient
numerical tool to determine the control centrality and the
structurally controllable subsystem of any node in an arbitrary
complex network (see Fig. S1).
Distribution of Control Centrality
We first consider the distribution of control centrality. Shown
in Fig. 2 is the distribution of the normalized control centrality
(cc(i):Cc(i)=N ) for several real networks. We find that for the
intra-organization network, P(cc) has a sharp peak at cc~1,
suggesting that a high fraction of nodes can individually exert
full control over the whole system (Fig. 2a). In contrast, for
company-ownership network, P(cc) follows an approximately
exponential distribution or a very short power-law distribution
(Fig. 2d), indicating that most nodes display low control
centrality. Even the most powerful node, with cc*0:01, can
control only one percent of the total dimension of the system’s
full state space. For other networks P(cc) displays a mixed
behavior, indicating the coexistence of a few powerful nodes
with a large number of nodes that have little control over the
system’s dynamics (Fig. 2b,c). Note that under full randomiza-
tion, turning a network into a directed Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER)
random network [35,36] with number of nodes (N) and number
of edges (L) unchanged, the cc distribution changes dramatical-
ly. In contrast, under degree-preserving randomization [37,38],
which keeps the in-degree (kin) and out-degree (kout) of each
node unchanged, the cc distribution does not change signifi-
cantly. This result suggests that P(cc) is mainly determined by
the underlying network’s degree distribution P(kin, kout). (Note
that similar results were also observed for the minimum number
of driver nodes [12] and the distribution of control range [28].)
This result is very useful in the following sense: P(kin, kout) is
easy to calculate for any complex network, while the calculation
of P(cc) requires much more computational efforts (both CPU
time and memory space). Studying P(cc) for model networks of
prescribed P(kin, kout) will give us qualitative understanding of
how P(cc) changes as we vary network parameters, e.g. mean
degree SkT. See Fig. S7 for more details.
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Control Centrality and Topological Features
To understand which topological features determine the control
centrality itself, we compared the control centrality for each node
in the real networks and their randomized counterparts (denoted
as rand-ER and rand-Degree). The lack of correlations indicates
that both randomization procedures eliminate the topological
feature that determines the control centrality of a given node (see
Fig. S2). Since accessibility plays an important role in maintaining
structural controllability [29], we conjecture that the control
centrality of node i is correlated with the number of nodes Nr(i)
that can be reached from it. To test this conjecture, we calculated
Nr(i) and Cc(i) for the real networks shown in Fig. 2, observing
only a weak correlation between the two quantities (see Fig. S3).
This lack of correlation between Nr(i) and Cc(i) is obvious in a
directed star, in which a central hub (x1) points to N{1 leaf nodes
(x2,    , xN ) (Fig. 1c). As the central hub can reach all nodes,
Nr(1)~N , suggesting that it should have high control centrality.
Yet, one can easily check that the central hub has control
centrality Cc(1)~2 for any N§2 and there are N{1 structurally
controllable subsystems, i.e. fx1, x2g,    ,fx1, xN{1g. In other
words, by controlling the central hub we can fully control each leaf
node individually, but we cannot control them collectively.
Note that in a directed star each node can be labeled with a
unique layer index: the leaf nodes are in the first layer (bottom layer)
and the central hub is in the second layer (top layer). In this case
the control centrality of the central hub equals its layer index (see
Fig. 1c). This is not by coincidence: we can prove that for a
directed network containing no cycles, often called a directed
acyclic graph (DAG), the control centrality of any node equals its
layer index.
Cc(i)~li: ð4Þ
Indeed, lacking cycles, a DAG has a unique hierarchical structure,
which means that each node can be labeled with a unique layer
Figure 1. Control centrality. (a) A simple network of N~7 nodes. (b) The controlled network is represented by a directed graph G(A,B) with an
input node u1 connecting to a state node x1 . The stem-cycle disjoint subgraph Gs (shown in red) contains six edges, which is the largest number of
edges among all possible stem-cycle disjoint subgraphs of the directed graph G(A,B) and corresponds to the generic dimension of controllable
subspace by controlling node x1 . The control centrality of node 1 is thus Cc(1)~6. (c) The control centrality of the central hub in a directed star is
always 2 for any network size N§2. (d) The control centrality of a node in a directed acyclic graph (DAG) equals its layer index. In applying Hosoe’s
theorem, if not all state nodes are accessible, we just need to consider the accessible part (highlighted in green) of the input node(s).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044459.g001
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index (li), calculated using a recursive labeling algorithm [39]: (1)
Nodes that have no outgoing links (kout~0) are labeled with layer
index 1 (bottom layer). (2) Remove all nodes in layer 1. For the
remaining graph identify again all nodes with kout~0 and label
them with layer index 2. (3) Repeat step (2) until all nodes are
labeled. As the DAG lacks cycles, each subgraph in the set G of the
directed graph G(A,b(i)) consists of a stem only, which starts from
the input node pointing to the state node i and ends at a state node
in the bottom layer, e.g. u1?x1?x2?x4 in Fig. 1d. The number
of edges in this stem is equal to the layer index of node i, so
rankg(C
(i))~Cc(i)~li. Therefore in DAG the higher a node is in
the hierarchy, the higher is its ability to control the system.
Though this result agrees with our intuition to some extent, it is
surprising at the first glance because it indicates that in a DAG the
control centrality of node i is only determined by its topological
position in the hierarchical structure, rather than any other
importance measures, e.g. degree or betweenness centrality. This
result also partially explains why driver nodes tend to avoid hubs
[12]. (Note that similar phenomena about have been observed in
other problems, e.g. networked transportation [40], synchroniza-
tion [41] and epidemic spreading [42]).
Despite the simplicity of Eq. (4), we cannot apply it directly to
real networks, because most of them are not DAGs. Yet, we note
that any directed network has a underlying DAG structure based
on the strongly connected component (SCC) decomposition (see
Fig. S4). A subgraph of a directed network is strongly connected if
there is a directed path from each node in the subgraph to every
other node. The SCCs of a directed network G are its maximal
strongly connected subgraphs. If we contract each SCC to a single
supernode, the resulting graph , called the condensation of G, is a
DAG [43]. Since a DAG has a unique hierarchical structure, a
directed network can then be assigned an underlying hierarchical
structure. The layer index of node i can be defined to be the layer
index of the corresponding supernode (i.e. the SCC that node i
belongs to) in . With this definition of li, it is easy to show that
Cc(i)§li for general directed networks (see Fig. S6 for more
details). Furthermore, for an edge (i?j) in a general directed
Figure 2. Distribution of normalized control centrality of several real-world networks (blue) and their randomized counterparts:
rand-ER (red), rand-Degree (green), plotted in log-log scale. (a) Intra-organizational network of a manufacturing company [49]. (b) Hyperlinks
between weblogs on US politics [50]. (c) Email network in a university [51]. (d) Ownership network of US corporations [52]. In- and out-degree
distributions for each network are shown in the insets. See Table 1 for other network characteristics.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044459.g002
Table 1. Real networks analyzed in the paper.
name N L SkT r c
ION-Manufacturing [49] 77 2,228 57.9 20.017 0.244
Political blogs [50] 1,224 19,025 31.1 20.196 0.174
Email network [51] 3,188 39,256 24.6 20.240 0.128
Ownership-USCorp [52] 7,253 6,726 1.9 20.181 0.004
For each network, we show its name and reference; number of nodes (N) and
edges (L); mean degree (SkT); degree correlation (r) [4]; and clustering
coefficient (c) [53], respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044459.t001
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network, if node i is topologically ‘‘higher’’ than node j (i.e. liwlj ),
then Cc(i)wCc(j). Since Cc(i) has to be calculated via linear
programming which is computationally more challenging than the
calculation of li, the above results suggest an efficient way to
calculate the lower bound of Cc(i) and to compare the control
centralities of two neighboring nodes. Note that if liwlj and there
is no directed edge (i?j) in the network, then in general one
cannot conclude that Cc(i)wCc(j) (see Fig. S5 for more details).
Attack Strategy
Our finding on the relation between control centrality and
hierarchical structure inspires us to design an efficient attack
strategy against malicious networks, aiming to affect their
controllability. The most efficient way to damage the controlla-
bility of a network is to remove all input nodes fu1, u2,    , uMg,
rendering the system completely uncontrollable. But this requires a
detailed knowledge of the control configuration, i.e. the wiring
diagram of G(A,B), which we often lack. If the network structure
(A) is known, one can attempt a targeted attack, i.e. rank the nodes
according to some centrality measure, like degree or control
centrality, and remove the nodes with highest centralities [44,45].
Though we still lack systematic studies on the effect of a targeted
attack on a network’s controllability, one naively expects that this
should be the most efficient strategy. But we often lack the
knowledge of the network structure, which makes this approach
unfeasible anyway. In this case a simple strategy would be random
attack, i.e. remove a randomly chosen P fraction of nodes, which
naturally serves as a benchmark for any other strategy. Here we
propose instead a random upstream attack strategy: randomly choose a
P fraction of nodes, and for each node remove one of its incoming
or upstream neighbors if it has one, otherwise remove the node
itself. A random downstream attack can be defined similarly, removing
the node to which the chosen node points to. In undirected
networks, a similar strategy has been proposed for efficient
immunization [45] and the early detection of contagious outbreaks
[46], relying on the statistical trend that randomly selected
neighbors have more links than the node itself [47,48]. In directed
networks we can prove that randomly selected upstream (or
downstream) neighbors have more outgoing (or incoming) links
than the node itself. Thus a random upstream (or downstream)
attack will remove more hubs and more links than the random
attack does. But the real reason why we expect a random upstream
attack to be efficient in a directed network is because Cc(i)§Cc(j)
for most edges (i?j), i.e. the control centrality of the starting node
Figure 3. The impact of different attack strategies on network controllability with respective to the random attack.
d:½rankStrategy{jg (C0){rankRandomg (C0)=N with rankStrategy{jg (C0) represents the generic dimension of controllable subspace after removing a P
fraction of nodes using strategy-j. The nodes are removed according to six different strategies. (Strategy-0) Random attack: randomly remove P
fraction of nodes. (Strategy-1 or 2) Random upstream (or downstream) attack: randomly choose P fraction of nodes, randomly remove one of their
upstream neighbors (or downstream neighbors). The results are averaged over 10 random choices of P fraction of nodes with error bars defined as
s.e.m. Lines are only a guide to the eye. (Strategy-3,4, or 5) Targeted attacks: remove the top P fraction of nodes according to their control centralities
(or in-degrees or out-degrees).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044459.g003
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is usually no less than the ending node of a directed edge (see Fig.
S8). In DAGs, for any edge (i?j), we have strictly Cc(i)wCc(j).
Thus, the upstream neighbor of a node is expected to play a more
important or equal role in control than the node itself, a result
deeply rooted in the nature of the control problem, rather than the
hub status of the upstream nodes.
To show the efficiency of the random upstream attack we
compare its impact on fully controlled networks with several other
strategies. We start from a network that is fully controlled
(rankg(C)~N) via a minimum set of ND driver nodes. After the
attack a P faction of nodes are removed, denoting with rankg(C
0)
the dimension of the controllable subspace of the damaged
network. We calculate rankg(C
0) as a function of P, with P tuned
from 0 up to 1. Since the random attack serves as a natural
benchmark, we calculate the difference of rankg(C
0) between a
given strategy and the random attack, denoted as
d~½rankStrategy{jg (C0){rankRandomg (C0)=N. Obviously, the more
negative is d, the more efficient is the strategy compared to a fully
random attack. We find that for most networks random upstream
attack results in dv0 for 0vPv1, i.e. it causes more damage to
the network’s controllability than random attack (see Fig. 3b,c,d).
Moreover, random upstream attack typically is more efficient than
random downstream attack, even though in both cases we remove
more hubs and more links than in the random attack. This is due
to the fact that the upstream (or downstream) neighbors are
usually more (or less) ‘‘powerful’’ than the node itself.
The efficiency of the random upstream attack is even
comparable to targeted attacks (see Fig. 3). Since the former
requires only the knowledge of the network’s local structure rather
than any knowledge of the nodes’ centrality measures or any other
global information (i.e. the structure of the A matrix) while the
latter rely heavily on them, this finding indicates the advantage of
the random upstream attack. The fact that those targeted attacks
do not always show significant superiority over the random attacks
is intriguing and would be explored in future work. Notice that for
the intra-organization network all attack strategies fail in the sense
that d is either positive or very close to zero (Fig. 3a). This is due to
the fact this network is so dense (with mean degree SkT&58) that
we have Cc(i)~Cc(j)~N for almost all the edges (i?j).
Consequently, both random upstream and downstream attacks
are not efficient and the Cc-targeted attack shows almost the same
impact as the random attack. This result suggests that when the
network becomes very dense its controllability becomes extremely
robust against all kinds of attacks, consistent with our previous
result on the core percolation and the control robustness against
link removal [12]. We also tested those attack strategies on model
networks (see Fig. S9, S10 and S11). The results are qualitatively
consistent with what we observed in real networks.
Discussion
In sum, we study the control centrality of single node in complex
networks and find that it is related to the underlying hierarchical
structure of networks. The presented results help us better
understand the controllability of complex networks and design an
efficient attack strategy against network control. Due to the duality of
controllability and observability [18,19], a similar centrality measure
can be defined to quantify the ability of a single node in observing
the whole system, i.e. inferring the state of the whole system.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Calculation of control centrality (or the
generic dimension of the controllable subspace). (a) The
original controlled system is represented by a digraph G(A,B). (b)
The modified digraph G’(A,B) used in solving the linear
programming. Dotted and solid lines are assigned with weight
wij~0 and 1, respectively. The maximum-weight cycle partition is
shown in red, which has weight 3, corresponding to the generic
dimension of controllable subspace by controlling node x1 or
equivalently the control centrality of node x1.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Control centrality of nodes in several real-
world networks and their randomized counterparts:
rand-ER (red), rand-Degree (green). (a) Intra-organizational
network of a manufacturing company. (b) Hyperlinks between
weblogs on US politics. (c) Email network in a university. (d)
Ownership network of US corporations.
(TIF)
Figure S3 Control centrality vs. the number of reach-
able nodes. The real networks are the same as used in Fig. S2.
(TIF)
Figure S4 Any directed network has a underlying
hierarchical structure. (a) A directed network of 50 nodes.
There are seven SCCs highlighted in different colors. The nodes
are colored according to their control centrality. The edge (i?j) is
colored in green, red, or blue if Cc(i) is larger than, smaller than,
or equal to Cc(j), respectively. For all edges with liwlj , we have
Cc(i)wCc(j). But this is not true for general node pairs fi, jg. (b)
The condensation of the network in (a) is a DAG with three layers.
Each node in the DAG represents a SCC in the original network.
(TIF)
Figure S5 Even if a lower node is accessible from a
higher node, it is still possible that the control centrality
of the higher node is smaller than or equal to the lower
one.
(TIF)
Figure S6 Control centrality as a function of layer index
in several real-world networks. The real networks are the
same as used in Fig. S2. Symbol (‘z’) represents the average value
of Cc with error bar defined as the Cc range, i.e. ½Cminc ,Cmaxc , for
all the nodes in the same layer of the largest connected component
of the network. Dotted lines represents Cc(i)~li.
(TIF)
Figure S7 Variation of the hierarchical structure and its
impact on the distribution of control centrality. (a)
Number of layers (NL). (b) Size of the giant SCC. Both ER and
SF networks are generated from the Chung-Lu model with
N~104 and the results are averaged over 100 realizations with
error bars defined as s.e.m. Dotted lines are only a guide to the
eye. (c,d,e) Distribution of control centrality for ER networks at
different SkT values (SkT~1,2,8).
(TIF)
Figure S8 Fraction of edges (i?j) which satisfy
Cc(i)wCc(j). Fractions of edges (i?j) with Cc(i)wCc(j),
Cc(i)vCc(j), and Cc(i)~Cc(j), are denoted as fw, fv, and f~,
respectively. Both ER and SF networks are generated from the
Chung-Lu model with N~103 and the results are averaged over
100 realizations with error bars defined as s.e.m. Dotted lines are
only a guide to the eye. (a) ER network. (b) SF network with
c~2:5. (c) SF network with c~2:1.
(TIF)
Figure S9 Impact of different attack strategies on
network controllability. rankStrategy{jg (C
0) represents the
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generic dimension of controllable subspace after removing a P fraction
of nodes using strategy-j. The nodes are removed according to 10
different strategies (see text). Both ER and SF networks are generated
from the Chung-Lu model with N~103 and the results are averaged
over 10 random choices of P fraction of nodes with error bars defined
as s.e.m. Lines are only a guide to the eye.
(TIF)
Figure S10 Impact of different attack strategies on
network controllability with respect to random attack.
d:½rankStrategy{jg (C0){rankStrategy{0g (C0)=N denotes the gener-
ic dimension difference of the controllable subspace after removing
a P fraction of nodes using strategy-j and random attack. The
more negative is d, the more efficient is the strategy compared to a
random attack. Symbols are the same as used in Fig. S9.
(TIF)
Figure S11 Impact of different attack strategies on
network connectivity. nlc represents the normalized size of
the largest connected component of the network after removing a
P fraction of nodes. The nodes are removed according to 10
different strategies (see text). Both ER and SF networks are
generated from the Chung-Lu model with N~103 and the results
are averaged over 10 random choices of P fraction of nodes with
error bars defined as s.e.m. Lines are only a guide to the eye.
(TIF)
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